The Open Method of Co-ordination on Pensions - An Economic Analysis of its Effects on Pension Reforms by Martina Eckardt
                                                                                                                                                                                       
 
 
Thünen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 
Thünen-Reihe Angewandter Volkswirtschaftstheorie 
 
 




The Open Method of Co-ordination on Pensions – 









Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät 
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre 
2003                                                                                                                                                                                       
 
The Open Method of Co-ordination on Pensions –  









This paper analyses the potential effects of the open method of co-ordination on pension re-
forms in the  European Union from an economic point of view. The main results are: (1) For 
the first time, the Commission formally participates in the input of pension policy-formation 
of the member states, but without affecting their ultimate decision-making powers. (2) How-
ever, the OMC might foster yardstick competition and thus mutual learning from the reform 
experiences of other member states. (3) In contrast to that, no clear effects on the rent-seeking 
behaviour of special-interest groups and thus on their influence in shaping pension reforms 
can be derived. 
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At this year’s annual spring meeting in Brussels the European Council welcomed the Joint 
Report by the Commission and the Council on adequate and sustainable pensions (Council 
2003a). This report is an important first result of the open method of co-ordination (OMC) in 
the field of old-age security. The OMC was explicitly introduced as a new governance method 
at the Lisbon Summit in 2000. The OMC should be applied in such policy fields in which 
there are no explicit competencies at the EU level. That is where the responsibilities still rest 
solely with national governments, as it is the case with social security. National policies are 
compared and evaluated with respect to common objectives and indicators; the recommenda-
tion of best practises should promote mutual learning among the member states. Drawing on 
the experiences made in the field of the European Employment Strategy (Régent 2002), since 
2001 the OMC is also applied to pension politics.  
With the Joint Report a first assessment of the effects of the OMC in  the field of old-age se-
curity can be made. The objective of this paper is to analyse the potential impact of the OMC 
on pension politics from an economic point of view. All EU member states face nearly the 
same serious problems with regard to the demographic shifts ahead in the light of persisting 
labour market problems. Thus, the traditional old-age security systems have come under se-
vere pressure. This calls for fundamental changes to cope with the imminent financial bur-
dens. Since the responsibilities for pension reforms rest with the national level, the main ques-
tion is whether the OMC may help to promote the necessary pension policy reforms. 
In order to assess the impact of the OMC in this field, section 2 describes the influence al-
ready exerted by the EU on old-age security systems, the current design of the OMC on pen-
sions as well as its main outcomes. The impact of the OMC on national pension policy forma-
tion and implementation is analysed in section 3. This gives rise to the question whether the 
OMC might lead to a shift of competencies from the national to the supranational level and 
thus lead to more centralisation in the field of pension politics within the EU. Section 4 analy-
ses the potential consequences for regulatory competition. The focus is on the impact on mu-
tual learning from the experiences of other countries with pension reforms on the one hand 
and on coping with rent-seeking behaviour on the other hand. Finally, the main findings are 
summarized in section 5.  
2.   EU Competencies and the OMC in the Field of Old-Age Security 
2.1  The Influence of the EU on National Pension Systems and Policies 
The old-age security systems of the EU member states differ in many respects. Although they 
can be roughly classified as falling either under the Bismarck or Beveridge type
1, each na-
tional system displays its own historically evolved particularities.
2 While in the 1990s there 
                                                 
1  For a short description of the different types of social security systems see Scharpf (2002), for a more de-
tailed discussion see Begg et.al. (2001), Esping-Anderson (1990), Ferrera/Hemerijck/Rhodes (2001). 
2   There are differences in the predominant objective (to prevent poverty or to maintain a certain standard of 
living), in the importance of the first pillar of public pension schemes, the second pillar of occupational pen-
sion schemes and the third pillar of private pension schemes as well as in the principles which guide the con-
tributions to, the benefits from and the organisation of these schemes, not to mention the treatment of differ- 
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had been some debate about whether it would be useful to harmonise the different social secu-
rity systems or at least to strive for their convergence, now there seems to be a broad consen-
sus that this would be neither reasonable nor feasible (Schmähl 2001). Nevertheless, the pen-
sion systems of all member states face the same problems, even though to a different degree. 
The most important are 
•  the demographic change, which will lead to a strong increase in the old-age dependency 
ratio (that is the number of persons over 65 to the number of persons aged 15 to 64); 
•  labour market problems which result in an insufficient utilization of the labour force poten-
tial; 
•  socio-cultural changes which will increase flexible and non-permanent employment con-
tracts; 
•  growing international interdependencies (globalisation) which will further strengthen pres-
sure on labour costs and competition among different tax and social security systems. 
Together, these factors might well lead to financial instability of pension systems, to a de-
crease in the adequacy of benefits, and to a smaller ratio of persons covered. Among experts, 
there is a broad consensus about the primary direction reforms should take. Besides reducing 
labour market problems through employment policies, inefficiencies in pension systems 
should be reduced. Especially changes in financing with less reliance on pay-as-you-go 
schemes by strengthening funded elements are favoured. The latter can be realised by intro-
ducing funded components in the first pillar of statutory schemes or by shifting the weight 
from the first to the second or third pillar of occupational and private schemes. Another im-
portant step to cope with the imminent challenges concerns measures to weaken incentives for 
early retirement, so that the effective retirement age increases.  
Although responsibilities for social security and therefore for the overall design of old-age 
provisions still rest with the individual member states, the Commission and the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) nevertheless have gained some influence both on national pension sys-
tems as well as on national pension policies through their legislation and jurisdiction (figure 
1) (Eckardt 2002; Schmähl 2002). The EC Treaty states the following central objectives for 
creating a common market and a common political union: (1) no discrimination of EU citi-
zens, (2) the implementation of the four basic freedoms, (3) uniform competition rules, and 
(4) the European Monetary Union (EMU). The ECJ intervenes in its jurisdiction on non-
discrimination for example where different access to national pension schemes is granted for 
persons according to their citizenship or gender. This concerns collective as well as occupa-
tional and private pension schemes. Due to its competence to create a common market, the 
Commission has widespread influence on those components of the second and third pillar of 
the national pension systems which rely on the market mechanism. A prominent example is 
the common market on life-assurance, which was established by three generations of direc-
tives in 1994. These directives made necessary profound re-regulations in many member 
states. Because of differences in legal and tax treatment, a directive on pension funds and 
other comparable occupational pension schemes had been under discussion for years now, but 
according to the Financial Services Action Plan it should be finally adopted by the end of 
                                                                                                                                                          
ent socio-economic groups. For an overview see Economic Policy Committee (2001), OECD (1998), the Na-
tional Strategy Reports (2002).  
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2003. With this directive, the preconditions for a common market for occupational pensions 
would be finally created.  
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Source: Own composition 
Also still under discussion is a reform of regulation 1408/71 which is at the heart of the so-
called co-ordinating European social law (Eichenhofer 2000; Schulte 2001). It governs the 
coordination of entitlements which migrant workers and their families have acquired in the 
social security systems of different member states. Its central role lies in guaranteeing the free 
movement of labour. The reform of regulation 1408/71 shall summarize and simplify the cur-
rent state of the co-ordination law. This is characterized by a complicated case law developed 
by the ECJ over the years. However, it is not intended to intervene in the national social secu-
rity systems.  
A more far-reaching impact on the first pillar of collective pension systems might emerge 
from the EMU related Stability and Growth Pact and the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 
(BEPG). Both tax-financed as well as contribution-financed pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension 
systems of the first pillar are part of public budgets. With the demographic changes ahead, 
these old-age security systems might well jeopardise balanced national budgets if reforms are  
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not undertaken in time. Therefore, the first pillar of national pension systems has come into 
the focus of the Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB). Although the Stability 
and Growth Pact gives no competencies to the EU to directly influence national pension sys-
tems, the Commission’s activities have been recently intensified in this field due to the poten-
tial risks for balanced public budgets.
3  
To summarize, at the moment the Commission and the ECJ have well-defined responsibilities 
with respect to the second and third pillar of national pension systems, as far as both the free 
movement of labour, goods, services, and capital as well as uniform competition rules are 
concerned. But they have no direct competencies to regulate the design of the first pillar of 
national pension systems or to decide on the weight given to the three pillars in single mem-
ber states. Up to now, the growing influence of the EU on national old-age security is primar-
ily a consequence of decisions taken by the member states themselves to shift the weight for 
providing adequate old-age income to the second and third pillar. Since these two pillars rely 
more on private markets, they fall within the responsibility of the EU. But now the OMC pro-
vides an institutionalised framework which for the first time allows the Commission to take 
actively part in the debate on national pension policies in a formal way.  
2.2  The Design and First Results of the OMC on Pensions 
At the Lisbon summit in 2000 it was stated that the central objective of the EU should be to 
become “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable 
of sustainable economic growth with better and more jobs and greater social cohesion” by 
2010 (Council 2003b, 1). Also in 2000 the Social Agenda was agreed upon by the European 
Council. Better coordination of national employment and social policy provisions as well as 
the modernisation of the national social security systems is regarded as a key feature to reach 
the above stated aim. The OMC was formally introduced to support this strategy in such pol-
icy fields where the EU has no legislative competencies, as for example in the field of old-age 
provision and social inclusion.  
The OMC has evolved from the experiences gained by the European Employment Strategy 
(EES) which follows the same overall procedure (figure 2).
4 The EU Council defines common 
objectives and (as far as possible quantitative) targets, to which the member states regularly 
present national strategy reports. Based on these reports the Commission and the competent 
Committees involved assess and compare the national efforts to reach these targets. Ideally, 
the Commission will formulate recommendations for each state based on the best practises 
identified in the national strategy reports, which the member states then would implement. 
The whole process rests on the idea of benchmarking, peer review, and mutual learning. For it 
to work, not only commonly agreed objectives but also well-defined indicators to reliably 
compare the performance of different member states are a necessary prerequisite.  
                                                 
3   In 1999 the Ageing Working Group AWG was established by the Economic Policy Committee. It carried out 
projections of public spending on pensions up to 2050 (Economic Policy Committee 2001). These projec-
tions might well prove to be quite influential in the discussion of the necessity of further pension reforms in 
the individual member states. 
4   Not de jure, but de facto also the BEPG can be regarded underlying the same procedure as the OMC. For an 
overview of the areas to which the OMC is applied see Working Group (2001); for a detailed discussion see 
for example De la Porte/Pochet (2001; 2002a), Goetschy (1999), Hodson/Maher (2001).  
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The OMC is not uniformly applied to all the diverse areas like employment policy, social ex-
clusion, education or pension policies. For example, the OMC on pensions does not involve a 
ranking of the member states according to the performance of their pension systems. Further-
more, there are no formal sanctions in the case of non-compliance.  While in some areas like 
employment the Commission could provide financial incentives, in the filed of pension poli-
tics only pressure from the process of peer review might induce member states to adopt pen-
sion reforms.  
Figure 2: The Design of the OMC 
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Source: Own composition. 
In 2001 the EU Council agreed upon “safeguarding the capacity of systems to meet their so-
cial objectives, maintaining their financial stability and meeting changing societal needs” 
(Council 2002, p.9) as the three main principles national pension schemes and policies should 
strive for. These principles are specified in eleven objectives (figure 3). In the 2002 and 2003 
BEPG the principle of financial sustainability of pension systems is included with a three-
pronged strategy. By raising employment rates, reducing public debt levels, and reforming 
pension systems, the impact of an ageing society on public finances should be coped with 
(Commission 2002a, 19; Commission 2003, 10f.). Up to now, no agreement could be reached 
about quantitative targets for the overall principles and/ or the different objectives.  
In autumn 2002 for the first time the member states presented National Strategy Reports (Na-
tional Strategy Reports 2002). To evaluate the success of the measures taken to reach the 
agreed objectives, the Economic Policy Committee (EPC) and the Social Protection Commit-
tee (SPC) are in charge of developing indicators which allow for a comparison of the per- 
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formance of the different pension systems.
5 Since this proves to be a very difficult and com-
plicated task and because of limited personnel resources, the schedule could not be kept.
6 
Thus, currently there are only few indicators used. As indicators for the overall principle of 
adequacy, relative poverty ratios and the relative income situation of older people are calcu-
lated and the inequality of the income distribution is presented (Council 2003a). To evaluate 
the impact of different pension schemes on financial sustainability, age-related employment 
rates according to the Lisbon and Stockholm targets are used. Besides, the average age of 
withdrawal from the labour market and public pension expenditures as a percentage of GDP 
are calculated (Council 2003a).  
Figure 3: The Objectives of the OMC on Pensions 
Principle 1: Adequacy of Pension Systems 
  Objective 1:  Preventing social exclusion 
  Objective 2:  Enabling people to maintain living standards 
  Objective 3:  Promoting solidarity 
Principle 2: Financial Sustainability of Pension Systems 
  Objective 4:  Raise employment levels 
  Objective 5:  Extend working lives 
  Objective  6: Making pension systems sustainable in a context of sound public 
   finances 
  Objective 7:  Adjust benefits and contributions in a balanced way 
  Objective  8: Ensure that private pension provision is adequate and financially 
   sound 
Principle 3: Modernisation: Responding to Changing Societal Needs 
  Objective 9:  Adapt more flexible employment and career patterns 
  Objective 10:Meet the aspirations for greater equality of women and men 
  Objective 11:Demonstrate the ability of pension systems to meet the challenges 
Source: Own composition according to Council (2003a) 
Even these few indicators have already prompted a lot of controversy among the actors in-
volved, which shows the great importance of commonly agreed indicators. There are both 
problems with the availability of data and with the design of the indicators (Behrendt 2002; 
Stanton 2002). The income data used are from the European Consumer Household Panel with 
the latest dating from 1998. Therefore, reforms in national pension systems, which had been 
put in force thereafter, are not reflected in these data. It also has to be ensured that the national 
data are comparable with respect to definitions and methods of data acquisition. The design of 
indicators for adequacy and modernisation is very demanding. Poverty measures are very sen-
sitive to the formula used, the time horizon applied, the income components included and so 
forth. Besides, the OMC on pensions mainly focuses on the first pillar of public pension 
schemes, and here primarily on monetary transfers. To really compare the living standards of 
pensioners from different member states, transfers in kinds as well as access to services have 
also to be taken into account, especially with regard to health, long-term care, and housing. 
Moreover, monetary transfers like tax subsidies in the second and third pillar are only margin-
ally reflected in the Joint Report. Furthermore, indicators which refer to the current income 
                                                 
5   For the composition, tasks and working of the committees see Jacobsson/Vifell (2003). 
6   Originally, these indicators were planned to be available in spring 2002.   
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position of pensioners mainly reflect past employment biographies and pension politics. 
Therefore, work is under way, but not yet completed in developing prospective indicators to 
evaluate potential future income positions of pensioners. This points to another important 
problem, since a reasonable balance between highly aggregated and rather disaggregated indi-
cators must be found. The consequences of different pension systems have to be evaluated not 
only for average values, but for persons with different employment biographies, including a-
typical ones. Micro simulations might be a promising way to supplement aggregated indica-
tors.  
Since currently there are no precise indicators available for all the objectives to be assessed, 
both the first draft version as well as the final Joint Report which was approved by the Coun-
cil at its spring meeting 2003 are primarily descriptive. They provide an analytical overview 
of the different pension systems and the main measures taken to reach the common objectives. 
All in all, neither a ranking of the relative performance of the individual pension systems of 
the member states nor a clear-cut list of best practises was drawn. Nevertheless, the material 
presented allows to draw one’s own conclusions about the relative (dis-) advantages of differ-
ent pension systems and policies taken.  
The Joint Report also mentions a number of follow-up tasks (Council 2003a, 105f.). In the 
first place further work on the development of indicators should be done, in particular with 
respect to future effects like expenditure projections or prospective replacement rates. Above 
that the applicant countries are also invited to provide National Strategy Reports based on the 
eleven common objectives. By 2006 an update of the member states’ National Strategy Re-
ports has to be provided to the EU Council which then will review the progress achieved and 
assess the further application of the OMC on pensions (Council 2003b). Meanwhile, the proc-
ess on streamlining which mainly concentrates on the BEPG and the EES might also affect 
the OMC on pensions, since there are overlapping activities which might be concentrated 
(Commission 2002b).  
3.   The Impact of the OMC on Pension Policy Formation 
The OMC on pensions is first of all a procedural instrument which provides an institutional 
framework for the exchange of information and collective learning about national pension 
systems and pension reforms in the EU member states (Hodson/Maher 2001). However, for 
the first time the OMC gives the Commission an explicit mandate to comment on national 
pension policies. To assess the resulting implications for policy-making in the field of old-age 
security, in the following it is analysed how the OMC changes the decision-making process in 
this field.  
From a positive point of view, economic policy decisions are generated in an evolutionary 
problem-solving process (Slembeck 2003). In this process, economic problems are not given 
as such, but they are the result of individual and collective perceptions about the underlying 
problems, their causes and their potential solutions. The number and kind of political solu-
tions are limited by the restrictions set out in the political framework of the respective mem-
ber state, which is based on its constitution. In the field of pension policies, the OMC supple-
ments the national decision-making level by providing an additional institutional framework 
on the supra-national level of the EU. With this institutional innovation, both the rules of the 
game as well as the number and the kind of players have changed. In addition to the national  
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governments and the social partners, now also the Commission, the EPC, and the SPC take 
part in pension politics.  
In a decision-making perspective, different phases of policy-formation can be distinguished 
(figure 4): (1) perception of the problem, (2) definition (cause-and-effect-chain, goal-setting, 
potential problem-solutions), (3) decision (through the legislature), (4) implementation, (5) 
evaluation and if necessary reforms (modification of the problem-solution). Put in this frame-
work, the ultimate decision-making power as well as the implementation of pension reforms 
still rest with the nation level (phases 3 and 4). However, the OMC grants the Commission 
influence on the input of policy-making. It is involved in pension politics through the defini-
tion of common problems, objectives and possible problem solutions in phases (1) and (2). By 
evaluating the measures taken by the national governments and by underlining best practises, 
the OMC gives also hints to further reforms and thus modifications of current pension policies 
(phase 5). 
Figure 4: The OMC on pensions from a decision-making perspective 
Actors Involved
• Member States
• Commission, EPC, SPC
•M e m b e r  S t a t e s   
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Source: Own composition. 
While the general principles are commonly agreed upon by the Council, nevertheless tensions 
between them exist. This is seen in particular in the weight which is attached to the two main 
principles of adequacy and financial sustainability of pensions. These tensions translate also 
into the priority which is assigned to reforms regarding either one of these principles. How- 
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ever, this dispute is rather a dispute among economically- and socially-oriented actors than 
between the Commission and national governments (de la Porte/Pochet 2002b).
7 Since both 
groups have different cognitive belief systems and theories which guide their perception of 
the problems on hand, also the proposed solutions vary (Denzau/North 1994; Slembeck 
2003). Roughly spoken, socially-oriented actors are more in favour of the adequacy goal, 
whereas economically-oriented actors give more weight to the goal of financial sustainability 
for pension reforms. The latter claim that the coming demographic shift may put the PAYG 
financed collective pension schemes and thus also public budgets under huge pressure. This 
would not only negatively affect the respective member state through higher debts and/or 
taxes, with negative consequences for economic growth and intergenerational justice. Above 
that, it would also exert negative externalities on other member states through the common 
currency by raising overall interest rates. Thus, member states with lower public deficits 
might have to pay for member states with budget deficits, too. Besides, old-age poverty has 
been successfully fought over the last decades, so that it is not seen as a problem today. In 
contrast to that, those who support adequacy as the guiding principle for pension reforms ar-
gue that it is not the task of old-age security systems or politics to consolidate public budgets, 
but to provide adequate income for the elderly. Only at second rank it had to be decided how 
this could be achieved most efficiently.  
While agreement exists with respect to the necessity of a later retirement age and a higher 
employment rate, opinions differ about the kind of other reforms depending on which group 
one adheres. Generally, most of those who put forward adequacy prefer to prevent poverty 
and simultaneously achieve a high standard of living by reliance on PAYG-financed collec-
tive pension schemes of the first pillar. To cope with the financial problems ahead they favour 
parametric reforms of the benefit formula and the contributions paid.
8 Those which advocate 
financial sustainability also support such parametric reforms. However, they suggest more 
fundamental structural modifications of the existing pension systems. In particular, they fa-
vour a stronger reliance on funded pension schemes, and a shift in the public-private mix by 
giving more weight to the second and third pillar. Thus, first pillar schemes would provide 
mainly some kind of minimum pensions to prevent old-age poverty, while occupational and 
personal pensions would ensure an adequate standard of living. With a shift to more funded 
pension schemes labour costs are expected to decrease, while at the same time capital supply 
would increase. This in turn could reduce interest rates and enhance growth of the GDP. Thus, 
the burden of higher pension benefits could be eased to some extent. However, the possibili-
ties for interpersonal redistribution would be reduced.  
Yet, up to now it is not decided which opinion will prevail. The supporters of the more social 
policy point of view are mainly found among trade unions and other NGOs. In most member 
states these are traditionally involved not only in providing social services, but also in the 
political decision-making process on pension reforms. Moreover, they are able to mobilize 
large parts of voters. In general these groups tend to be less in favour of more structural re-
forms. On the one hand, this is because of the underlying belief systems and cognitive frames 
                                                 
7   Jacobsson/Vifell (2003) show this to be true inter alia for the EPC and SPC. 
8   Examples are the introduction of a demographic factor in the benefit formula; actuarial fair calculations of 
benefits in case of earlier or later retirement; broadening of the persons covered by the collective pension 
schemes; higher contribution rates; cutbacks of periods for which no contributions have to be paid (training, 
military service); tax-financing of periods for which no contributions are paid (unemployment, maternity).  
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within which such matters are usually discussed. On the other hand, it would include a loss of 
influence. To put less weight on collective pension schemes would quite inevitably mean 
more individual responsibility and more reliance on markets and less on bureaucratic and po-
litical regulatory mechanisms. Therefore, these well organised interest groups are to be ex-
pected to resist profound structural changes of pension systems on the national level. That the 
trade unions can mobilise large numbers of people against reform efforts can be currently 
observed in all member states where the government intends to implement parametric pension 
reforms, as it is the case in Austria, France, Germany, or Italy for example. The ensuing pub-
lic opposition shows that so far the objective of financial sustainability has no broad support 
on the national level.  
In contrast to that, advocates of the principle of financial sustainability seem to be in a 
stronger position with respect to the OMC on pensions. They are backed by the EC Treaty and 
the Stability and Growth Pact as well as by the three-pronged strategy of the BEPG (ECB 
2003, 46f.). The DG Economic and Financial Affairs and its Committees are already doing 
quantitative projections and extensive studies on the influence of an ageing population on 
social security systems and public budgets.
9 Furthermore, there is strong support from the 
ECB (ECB 2003). Advocates of the objective of adequate pension income fear that fiscal con-
siderations might become predominant for pension reform issues.
10 This could be reinforced, 
since the effects of reduced financial burdens accrue rather immediately, while the resulting 
effects on the adequacy of pension income can be assessed only after decades. As long as no 
reliable prospective income indicators exist, which allow to evaluate the effect of more struc-
tural changes on future benefits, the rather short-termed policy-making process might further 
favour the principle of financial sustainability.  
However, presently, the OMC primarily takes stock of the current condition of the national 
pension systems. By channelling the discussion about the necessity of further reforms and by 
directing the political discussions to certain objectives and measures, the OMC could in prin-
ciple restrict the scope of national policy activities. In future legislative decision-making on 
the national level, the arguments provided by the OMC on pensions might gain influence in 
the national political debates, where it plays no role up to now.
11  In principle, the OMC might 
also contribute to accelerating the speed with which reforms are tackled by putting the overall 
objectives on the political agenda of the EU Council and thus also on the agenda of national 
policy-making.
12 From a decision-making point of view the OMC helps the Commission to 
strengthen its influence on national pension politics. By monitoring national reform processes, 
the Commission participates in framing the input of national policy-formation. By pushing 
forward certain objectives, arguments, and reform options, it might shape national pension 
policies to some extent in the future.  
                                                 
9   See the activities of the DG Economic and Financial Affairs on the economic and budgetary consequences of 
ageing, http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/about/activities/ activities_consequences ofage-
ing_en.htm, 27/05/03. 
10   See De la Porte/Pochet (2002b) and Scharpf (2002) for the idea that the application of the OMC on pensions 
was ultimately due to that concern. 
11   To the rather limited effect of the OMC on national policy formation see for Anderson (2002); 
Jacobsson/Vifell (2003); Jacobsson/Schmid (2002); Scharpf (2002). 
12   See the priorities set by the current Italian EU Presidency, http://www.ueitalia2003.it/EN/Temi/ economiaFi-
nanza/PrioritaPresidenza.htm, 13.07.2003.  
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4.   The Impact of the OMC on the Reforms of Old-Age Security Systems 
The growing economic and political integration in the EU influences both national pension 
systems and pension politics. As has been shown in section 2 and 3, so far this has led neither 
to a harmonisation of pension systems nor to a centralisation of competencies on pension poli-
tics. However, with the OMC the Commission now has for the first time a foot in the door to 
gain influence on national pension policies. The experiences in other policy areas like envi-
ronmental or competition policy show that in the past this has always led to a shift of compe-
tencies to the EU. This raises the question what consequences the OMC might have for pen-
sion politics. Generally spoken, the more centralised the responsibilities for policy formation 
are, the less competition takes place among different regulatory systems which will eventually 
result in growing harmonisation. In the following, it is first discussed what kind of regulatory 
competition, if any, applies to pension reforms (4.1). Secondly, the effects of the OMC for 
mutual learning (4.2) and for rent-seeking behaviour (4.3) are analysed.
13 
4.1  The OMC, Regulatory Competition, and Pension Reforms 
The economic theory of fiscal federalism extensively discusses the appropriate extent of cen-
tralisation for the provision of public goods, redistribution and taxation in multi-level govern-
ance systems like the EU (Breton 1998; Oates 1999, 2001, 2002). Closely related to this ques-
tion is the issue of interjurisdictional or locational competition (Siebert/Koop 1990; Sinn 
1997; Vanberg/Kerber 1994). The underlying issues are also discussed under the headline of 
regulatory competition.
14 Four different forms of regulatory competition can be distinguished: 
regulatory competition via mutual learning (yardstick competition), via international trade, via 
interjurisdictional or locational competition, and via choice of law (Kerber/Heine 2002). In-
ternational trade and interjurisdictional or locational competition only indirectly influence 
national regulations, while yardstick competition and competition via choice of law directly 
concern specific national regulations.  
In principle, for regulatory competition to be effective the same holds true as for competition 
on ordinary markets for goods and services. Ideally, the market mechanism helps to provide 
products and services best suited to the preferences and needs of consumers. It sets incentives 
to generate and disseminate innovations, and controls unfair market practises. A variety of 
diverse actions must be allowed for using the full potential of competition as a discovery pro-
cedure. Appropriate feedback mechanisms must exist which link the success (or failure) of a 
reform to the actions taken, so that successful outcomes can be identified at low costs. On 
economic markets, the price mechanism provides information about the conditions on the 
supply and demand side and thus promotes competition. On political markets, elections take 
the place of the price mechanism. To get elected politicians have to offer reform alternatives 
which are rewarded by voters. However, information costs are much higher on political mar-
                                                 
13   Both the question whether regulatory competition among old-age systems would lead to a race to the bottom 
or to a race to the top and the factors which determine the appropriate level of centralisation of pension poli-
tics in the EU would go beyond the scope of this paper. For a general discussion of these issues see Kerber 
(2003) 
14   The economic analysis of regulatory competition explicitly deals with the question of the appropriate alloca-
tion of competencies for the provision of legal rules and regulations (Kerber 2003, 16f.). For an overview see 
Kerber (2000); Sun/Pelkmans (995); Van den Bergh (2000).  
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kets than in most economic markets, since political problem-solutions offered by political 
parties and/or governments usually are complex experience and credence goods (Nelson 
1970; Darby/Karni 1973). Transparency on political markets is much lower, because both of 
the multitude of issues tackled, their complexity and the uncertainties of the potential reform 
outcomes. Therefore, the feedback on political markets is much weaker than on economic 
markets (North 1990a). 
Moreover, transmission mechanism must be at hand in the case of the only indirect effective 
regulatory competition via international trade and locational competition. In this cases, pen-
sion policy regulations compete only indirectly via their impact on the prices of goods and 
services which are internationally traded and via the incentives set by national governments to 
attract mobile factors (esp. firms, capital, and scarce labour skills). Contributions to collective 
public pension schemes affect the international competitiveness of an economy through taxes 
and factor costs. Nevertheless, the competitiveness of an economy is also influenced by a 
multitude of other factors, so that the respective effects can be only in part assigned to pension 
policy reforms. Therefore, there is only a rather weak link between the economic competi-
tiveness of a member state and the structural and parametric design of national old-age secu-
rity systems. 
Besides, pension reforms are the outcome of political decision-making and thus of competi-
tion on the political market. Since political markets are still national markets, successful pen-
sion reforms of other member states only indirectly enter competition on national political 
markets. However, the OMC might help to intensify yardstick competition which directly 
aims to particular policy reforms. Political yardstick competition requires that “the perform-
ance of the governments in various jurisdictions becomes sufficiently comparable so that the 
voters can alleviate the agency problems by making meaningful comparisons between juris-
dictions” (Bodenstein/ Ursprung 2001, p.4). The OMC on pension politics lowers information 
costs about policy options and outcomes. The National Strategy Reports as well as the Joint 
Report reduce the costs of information acquisition, procession and dissemination about pen-
sion systems and policies of other member states. By applying common objectives and indica-
tors the comparability of the performance of different pension systems is improved. Thus, the 
OMC might intensify the more direct yardstick competition of pension reforms in addition to 
the only indirect effective regulatory competition through economic competitiveness.  
4.2 The  OMC, Mutual Learning and Pension Reforms  
The main objective of the OMC is to foster mutual learning from the experiences of pension 
reforms in other member states and to promote the imitation of successful policy reforms. In 
general, workable competition allows to achieve not only allocative, but also dynamic effi-
ciency (North 1990b, p.81). On economic markets, if there are no barriers to market entry and 
exit, both innovators and imitators are attracted by the profits of successful innovations. Thus, 
if the intensity of competition is high, consumers will profit from a wide variety of products 
supplied at low costs. However, to realise the gains from dynamic efficiency, competitors 
must be free to generate and imitate innovations in a trial-and-error process. Scope for differ-
ent actions must exist. Heterogeneity characterizes such markets. On political markets, to get 
(re-)elected or to stay in power are the predominant incentives for offering innovative political 
problem-solutions. They are the main driving force equivalent to the profits which can be 
gained on economic markets from successful innovations. Since politicians only have incom- 
 
13
plete knowledge about the best policy solutions, yardstick competition might be a means to 
foster trial-and-error processes which result in innovative regulations (Kerber 2003). 
While on economic markets, usually there is always scope for product variations, within one 
member state there is only one overall old-age security system, with compulsory membership 
in the collective public pension schemes of the first pillar for most persons.
15 Besides, the 
scope for trial-and-error processes in pension reforms is strictly reduced because of the long-
term nature of pension systems. Since they affect decisions about capital formation, savings 
and labour supply over the life cycle of an individual, they must allow people to build stable 
expectations. Thus, they cannot be changed arbitrarily and in the short term without damaging 
the trust necessary for their incentives to work in the long run. 
By lowering information costs, the OMC might also contribute to the generation and imitation 
of innovative policy solutions for old-age security. It broadens the input of pension policy 
formation by granting low-cost access to the experiences made with different policy options 
in other member states. Thus, the variety of innovative problem solutions discussed within a 
member state should increase. In addition, it reduces the costs of gaining experiences with 
pension reform options, since appropriate problem-solutions of other member states can be 
imitated without taking all the risks involved in implementing genuinely novel solutions 
(Orenstein 2001).  
Furthermore, the OMC allows better coordination and thus utilisation of expert knowledge on 
pension schemes, policies and reforms which in turn might enable to better realise economies 
of scale and scope. While among pension experts there is broad consensus on both the under-
lying problems and the general reforms necessary to cope with it, this does not hold true for 
the electorate which has the ultimate power to vote for the direction of pension reforms. Thus, 
the OMC might also assist in the low-cost dissemination of expert knowledge to a wider part 
of the population. Since many reforms are deemed to be the more effective and the less costly, 
the sooner they are implemented, the OMC could thus contribute to overall efficiency.  
But the OMC might also negatively affect the scope for mutual learning from pension reform 
experiences in other member states. As it also strengthens the position of the Commission in 
proposing reform options and in assessing the provisions implemented by the national gov-
ernments, the Commission might eventually become an opinion-leader for the kind of reforms 
realised. In the extreme, the Commission could gain the competence to prescribe the objec-
tives and measures to be taken by the individual member states. By setting narrowly defined 
quantitative targets and imposing strict limits on the range of permitted reform options, for 
example, search efforts for innovative pension reform policies would be restricted to a narrow 
subset of possible alternatives. As a consequence reform efforts could tend to become more 
homogeneous. In this case, the intensity of yardstick competition would be reduced due to 
more centralisation of competencies to the supranational level. 
However, it is not to be assumed that the OMC will actually result in standardised pension 
policy provisions. Even national pension systems, which seem to be rather similar at first 
glance, differ widely in details, since each has evolved in a path-dependent way. Therefore, to 
                                                 
15   Due to the path-dependent evolution of old-age security systems in most countries there exist also particular 
pension schemes for certain socio-economic groups (like for civil servants, farmers etc.). However, again, 
membership is compulsory, there is no explicit competition among these different pension schemes. For Ger-
many see Schmähl (2002).  
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reach the same objectives, different provisions have to be implemented. Furthermore, specific 
national modifications will quite inevitably have to take place, because ex ante not all possible 
effects of reforms can be foreseen. In part, this is because of the complexity of pension sys-
tems and their interdependence with other policy areas (esp. with tax policy, health provi-
sions, long-term care). Besides, the reactions to such reforms are only partly predictable. Ad-
verse incentives might occur which make follow-up modifications necessary. Thus, even with 
commonly agreed upon objectives and best practises according to the OMC, national pension 
policies will not become uniform. The rather gradual path-dependent evolution of national 
old-age security systems will continue.  
All in all, as long as common objectives and best practices to achieve them are not prescribed 
through the OMC  by the Commission in a uniform way, the OMC will rather broaden the 
spectrum of possible reform alternatives on national political markets. In this way, successful 
pension reforms could disseminate far more easier than it is the case with the only indirectly 
effective regulatory competition through international trade or overall economic competitive-
ness.  
4.3 The  OMC and Rent-Seeking Behaviour 
Nevertheless, as experience with national pension reforms shows, there are strong forces at 
work which favour inertia. Despite the consensus among experts, powerful interest groups 
tend to defend the existing pension systems and thus their privileges. However, yardstick 
competition promoted by the OMC might be a way to weaken their influence. On economic 
markets, free market entry and exit as well as appropriate competition rules prevent unfair 
market practises and the undue exercise of market power. On political markets, asymmetric 
information results in a multiple principal-agent relationship between the electorate, political 
parties/ the government and public administration. Because of the asymmetric information 
politicians have discretionary scope to follow their own self-interest. It allows well-organised 
interest groups to influence political decision-making and thus to extract rents. Moral hazard 
and adverse selection are ubiquitous.  
The growing economic integration in the EU enhances competition in the common economic 
markets. It also reduces the discretionary scope of governments and interest groups within the 
individual member states. Therefore, it intensifies indirect regulatory competition and serves 
as a control mechanism for political power on the national level. Thus, both economic as well 
as political market-power is decreasing on the national level. By intensifying political yard-
stick competition in the field of pension policies, the OMC enhances transparency about the 
quality of the different pension systems. As a consequence, national governments might come 
under growing pressure to justify their pension policies, especially if they are in favour of 
special interest groups.  
However, the growing economic integration within the EU goes along with a gradual shift of 
political competencies to the supranational level of the EU. Complaints about a democratic 
deficit of EU institutions and thus a lack of control of political actors are well known. This 
holds especially for positive integration, which is about setting up regulations on the suprana-
tional level (Scharpf 1999, 45).
16 The more the Commission intervenes in national policies, 
                                                 
16  With respect to negative integration, that is the removal of obstacles to the common market and the imple-
mentation of the four basic freedoms, the competence of the EU is widely undisputed (Scharpf 1999, 43ff.).   
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the more relevant this lack of control becomes, since it allows well organised interest groups 
to gain uncontrolled access to policy-making on the EU level (Hodson/Maher 2001, 731f.; 
Höreth 1999). Moreover, there is a tendency to integrate interest groups like the Social Part-
ners, NGOs, trade associations etc. in the decision-making process through Committees, 
which altogether reduces transparency.  
This concerns also the OMC on pensions. The Commission has gained an institutionalised 
access to take part in pension policies (section 3). Well organised interest groups like the So-
cial Partners and trade associations of financial services demand to also participate in the 
OMC procedure (Hix 1999, 188ff.; Olson 1965). On the one hand, this might improve the 
quality of political solutions, since more and better information enters the policy-formation 
process (Breton 1998). On the other hand, transparency is lowered with respect to the interests 
involved. Because of the complexity of pension reforms and of the multitude of actors in-
volved, information costs for voters increase.
 Quite contrary to the growing weight of the EU 
in policy-making, it becomes more and more difficult to recognise at low costs which politi-
cian and/or interest group is responsible for which particular regulation. As a result, not only 
might interest groups get uncontrolled access at the EU level, but political competition on the 
national level might be further weakened. This would result in a renewed increase of the in-
fluence of interest group within the member states.  
All in all, it might be doubted that the OMC on pensions will strengthen the control function 
of regulatory competition and help to effectively reduce rent-seeking behaviour. Under the 
current institutional design quite the opposite effect is to be expected. However, the democ-
ratic deficit of the EU institutions is a central issue of the coming European Constitution, 
where it is also discussed to include the OMC  as a general policy measure. Depending on the 
precise design, the lack of political control on the EU level might be reduced.   
5.   Summary and Outlook 
Currently, the EU has competencies mainly with respect to the second and third pillar of oc-
cupational and personal pension schemes (section 2). Since they mainly rely on markets, the 
implementation of the four basic freedoms and the EU competition rules shape their perform-
ance. Up to now, there is no influence worth mentioning on the design of the first pillar of 
collective public pension schemes, despite the co-ordination of entitlements of migrant work-
ers.  
As has been shown in section 3, the OMC on pensions does not change this profoundly. How-
ever, while the final responsibilities and the implementation of reforms remain with the na-
tional governments, the Commission gets a foot in the political decision-making process. 
Since the Joint Report which also includes the evaluation of national pension policies is 
drafted and agreed upon by the Commission, the Commission will also influence the input of 
national policy-making in the field of first pillar pension schemes. At least, national govern-
ments will have to respond to the critics and proposals made in the Joint Report. Yet, up to 
now not all prerequisites for fully applying the OMC on pensions are met. In particular, much 
more work on data and indicators has to be done to appropriately compare the different pen-
sion schemes. Only then, the OMC on pensions will fully develop its potential.  
In  section 4 the impact of the OMC on pensions for promoting pension reforms was dis-
cussed. It was shown that the OMC is a means to promote yardstick competition for pension  
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regulations. While currently competition among different national pension systems takes 
place only very indirectly, the OMC increases transparency about the working of pension re-
forms. This will eventually lead to more direct competition. The OMC might promote mutual 
learning and the generation and diffusion of innovations in the field of pension policies. How-
ever, it is not to be expected that the OMC on pensions will trigger off profound structural 
changes, since at the national level strong interest groups still hamper such changes. The im-
pact of the OMC in reducing such rent-seeking behaviour seems to be only of a very limited  
range. But if pension reforms are already on the political agenda, the OMC might improve the 
kind and quality of information used in the national policy-formation processes. As a result, it 
might shape the direction and speed with which reforms are decided on and implemented. 
Currently, no statements can be made whether we will realise more centralisation by a further 
shift of competencies for pension policies to the EU level. But because of the imminent prob-
lems due to the demographic changes, it might well be that the EU will gain more importance. 
An important actor like the ECB already advocates a more profound shift of influence on na-
tional collective pension schemes to the EU level because of their importance for public 
budget deficits and thus on the common currency. While acknowledging that “national gov-
ernments remain exclusively responsible for implementing reforms”, the ECB expresses the 
opinion that “institutional incentives may need to be strengthened” (ECB 2003, 51) to shape 
the direction and speed of such reforms. Therefore, the same may apply to old-age security 
policy as to other policy fields, for which the EU incrementally expanded its responsibilities 
by widening and deepening its influence. In the end this might cumulate in more centralisa-
tion of competencies and a profound loss of responsibilities of national governments on pen-
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